India’s Multi-Alignment Strategy in the Ukraine War
By Umer Beigh
Modi’s Visits to Ukraine and Russia Signal a Balancing Act
Three weeks after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Kyiv and empathized with President Volodymyr Zelensky about the humanitarian loss in the ongoing conflict. He swiftly dispatched Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor, to St. Petersburg to brief Moscow about the meeting: “I have come here on the direction of PM Modi, who has conveyed his highest regards to you. His visit to Ukraine was greatly successful,” Doval told Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Earlier in July, when PM Modi arrived in Moscow, Ukraine’s President had expressed resentment toward the Indian leadership for receiving a warm reception from “the world’s bloody criminal.” A month later in August, PM Modi made his maiden visit to Ukraine, lasting only seven hours, to counter the negative impression that India was tilting towards Russia. This visit is termed “historic,” for it is the first state visit for any Indian leader in Ukraine since it established diplomatic relations in 1992.
India may not share a balance in its relationship with Russia and Ukraine but it wishes to create that balance in the ongoing war. PM Modi was categorical during the joint conference with Zelenskyy saying that India is not associated with this war: the Indian Prime Minister posited,
Not neutral: we have picked the side of peace.
India’s Strategic Autonomy
“First visiting Russia and then to Ukraine, PM Modi has sent a strong message (multi-alignment) targeted at the Global South,” Dr Julain Melnikova, Programme Manager of the Russian International Affairs Council, believed.
Seemingly, India doesn’t want the Ukraine-Russia war to continue. PM Modi has pushed for a multi-alignment with both countries: “The relationship between India and Russia is in a managed decline, harder to sustain using the economic side but strategically very useful for the time being,” Pramit Pal Chaudari, South Asia practice head of Eurasia Group, argued.
Many Western countries have pressured India to sack Russia for invading Ukraine, but India has repeatedly refused and built stronger ties with the Kremlin:
India neither supported sanctions against Russia nor criticized Russia’s invasion outrightly,
Rajan Kumar, an Assistant Professor of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told ScoonTV. “Russia has sought a pragmatic approach in addressing India’s economic dependence on Western interests. Likewise, despite the strategic rivalry with China, India has acknowledged the deepening bilateral relations between Russia and China,” he added.
Multi-Alignment Policy
Historically, the foreign policy of the Indian state has consistently struck a non-alignment movement for securing strategic autonomy to counterbalance the bipolar world order. Since 2022, Indian diplomatic efforts have shown a willingness to play an “active role in brokering a peace deal” between the conflicting sides, Ukraine and Russia, to assert its importance on the global stage.
“India hasn’t come up with any peace plan unlike China and Brazil,” Julian observed. PM Modi’s visit to Ukraine does not offer any substantiated news regarding the changing perspectives. “Analyzing the joint statement of Ukraine-India, wherein both countries have agreed they will be working on a comprehensive partnership in the future. Whether this partnership will ever materialize, we don’t know that exactly,” she cautioned.
However, both India and Ukraine are keen to improve ties in sectors such as agriculture, healthcare, culture, and, particularly, defense drone technology. PM Modi has shown assertiveness in assisting in Ukraine’s reconstruction post-conflict. Ukraine’s leadership in response has welcomed the gesture demonstrated by Indian leadership to visit Ukraine, which according to President Zelensky is a crucial step toward securing sovereignty.
Many observers say India doesn’t consider itself a global geopolitical power. The Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has made it clear that the country doesn’t want to engage or meddle in any war especially involving Western powers. Pramit pointed out,
From an Indian perspective, we have countries like Myanmar, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Yemen that too remain in war. And nobody in the West seems to pay much attention to it; possibly it doesn’t align with their interests.
Initially, public sentiment was largely against the Russian invasion. This shifted when Western countries condemned India for its stance at the UN. The perception further changed when reports claimed Indian students were kept in Ukraine ‘hostage’ which was used partially as an anti-Western framing to “influence public opinion” in the country.
The pro-Russian narrative allowed the Indian government to capitalize on the ongoing crisis by importing 10 times more Russian oil at lower prices. Interestingly, instead of benefiting economically marginalized masses, these discounted energy imports were financed by private refiners to reap maximum profits.
India has continued the historical strategy used by its predecessor who also restrained from criticizing or publicly condemning foreign invasions in the past. Beginning with the Soviet incursion into Hungary in 1956, then Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Given the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict, the Indian establishment aims to prioritize domestic and regional requirements—security in energy suppliers, economic growth, and defense interests—over aligning with the wishes of the US and its allies. While the country pushes for an intermediary role and its emphasis on “peace talks”, the litmus test for India will be its consistency of messaging.
Diplomatic Effort for Peace?
Earlier, when Western leaders asked PM Modi during the G-7 meeting in Italy whether he was interested in mediating between Russia and Ukraine, he responded that if both countries requested his intervention, he would not have a problem. However, there is growing concern regarding India lacking strong incentives to take the role of mediator considering the high risk involved in overstepping negotiations and India’s cagey approach.
The other reason India resisted criticizing Russia was the opportunity to use its influence as a “bargaining tool” for securing an economic advantage over Western powers as the outcome of its “act of balancing”. Now, how far the version of “neutrality” and their peace rhetoric will assist India in navigating ties with Russia and the West, will largely depend on its wavering relationship with its neighbors, especially China.
India’s PM visit to Kyiv following Moscow should be seen as a “symbolic gesture” towards showcasing Ukraine’s suffering in this war, which is aimed at pleasing Washington and reinforcing its stand of strategic autonomy.
In the words of Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, “India’s highly constructive and even friendly relationship” with both President Putin and Zelensky and with the US may secure “the line of getting first-hand information from the participants in this conflict,” Dmitry admitted.
For India, this trajectory of getting a chance to meditate offers a rare opportunity to showcase its diplomatic ability to bring stability to world affairs. On September 21, the Indian Prime Minister visited the US for UN meetings attended the Quad Summit, and is expected to meet President Zelenskyy. He will also be attending the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October. Amid such a tight shift expecting an unrealistic outcome from India’s peacemaking efforts goes beyond its purview of aligned interests in the global polity.
Whether India will go beyond the reliance on optics to damage control its Moscow visit and use its influence to drive the Americans and Ukrainians towards a “shared perspective” on conflict resolution will depend on India’s willingness to negotiate amongst the rival parties which involves geopolitical consequences and compromising its “India-first policy”.
