Belarus’ Balancing Act with China
By Nikola Mikovic
Despite being in Russia’s geopolitical orbit, Belarus – the Kremlin’s sole ally in Europe – is looking to enhance its economic, political, and military connections with China. Bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow does not seem to be able to guard against a possible Chinese expansion into its zone of influence.
That, however, does not mean that Beijing will seize the opportunity and crowd Russia out of the former Soviet republic. From the Chinese perspective, Belarus is the People’s Republic’s important economic partner in Eastern Europe. In 2016, the two nations established a comprehensive strategic partnership, although to this day the volume of Chinese investment in Belarus remains modest.
Chinese Interest in Belarus
In 30 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the total volume of investments from China into the Belarusian economy has amounted to around $2.6 billion. For comparison, in 2023 China invested $1.7 billion in Kazakhstan – Belarus’ ally in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAE) – while in 2022 Chinese investments in the Kazakh economy reached $1.4 billion. Thus, in the post-Soviet space, Belarus does not seem to be Beijing’s first choice when it comes to its investment policy.
Despite that, there are speculations in the West that China has some other goals in Belarus. Namely, to build a military base in the former Soviet republic. Although the two nations conducted joint military drills on July 4th and co-developed the Polonez multiple launch rocket system (MRLS) system in 2016, chances for such an outcome remain rather low. Even Ukrainian military expert and former Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officer Ivan Stupak argues that Belarus, being a landlocked country, is not very appealing to China. In his view, Chinese military bases are more likely to appear on Russian, rather than on Belarusian territory – specifically, near the Arctic Circle or on the Caspian Sea.
Belarus, for its part, can serve as a key hub for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as for the China-Europe freight trains. That is why Beijing and Minsk recently agreed to strengthen cooperation in the China-Europe Railway Express, set up an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism on the service, promote infrastructure connectivity, and jointly ensure the safety of the China-Europe freight train transport corridor.
As a result of Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang’s visit to Belarus on August 23, Beijing and Minsk also agreed to strengthen economic and security ties. According to Li, China stands ready to work with Belarusian leaders to “push for the high-level development of their all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership to better benefit the two peoples.“
In 2017, in an attempt to develop an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” with China, Belarus offered 22 state-owned enterprises for privatization exclusively to Chinese corporations. None of these firms, however, appeared to attract Chinese interest. Nevertheless, in 2019 China was among the top-three largest creditors for Belarus. However, the Belarusian 2020 controversial presidential election, following a regime change attempt, seems to have affected economic ties between Minsk and Beijing.
Lukashenko’s Russian Ties
After the Kremlin effectively helped President Alexander Lukashenko crackdown on mass protests, Russia approved a $1 billion credit to its ally. Moscow firmly supported the Belarusian strongman, drawing the former Soviet republic even further into the Russian geopolitical orbit. As a result, in February 2022, Minsk allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory for its invasion of Ukraine, a move that had a serious impact on Belarus’ relations with the West.
Previously, in 2020 and 2021, following the suppression of protests and the arrest of prominent dissidents, the United States and its allies imposed sanctions on Belarus. Lukashenko’s indirect involvement in Russia’s special military operations in Ukraine led to additional restrictions being placed on Minsk by Western powers. Because of this, the Belarusian leader had to end his decades-old “multi-vector” foreign policy – whose major goal was to strike a balance between Russia and the West – and strengthen his ties with the Kremlin instead.
Such a move, however, did not affect his political relations with China. Between 2020 and 2024, Lukashenko met with Chinese President Xi Jinping several times. In March 2023, the Chinese leader said that the China-Belarus friendship is “unbreakable”, while in December of that year, Lukashenko expressed hope that China would “continue to develop and grow stronger”, which he believes would “contribute to global peace and progress.”
Following his most recent meeting with Li in Minsk, Lukashenko emphasized that he would like to see “more Chinese technologies” in Belarus. Lukashenko publicly glorified Beijing’s economic policy,
You have created your own global navigation system. You have built the world’s largest telescope. You have designed China’s orbital station and wide-body aircraft. China is a leader in batteries, solar panels, high-speed trains, electric cars, and more.
The problem for Minsk, however, is that the lack of structural reforms, as well as the Belarusian Soviet-style economy, seem to prevent a greater influx of Chinese investment. That is why, economically, Belarus remains heavily dependent on Russia, while Lukashenko, besides attempting to deepen economic ties with Beijing, is inclined to focus more on strengthening political relations with the Chinese leadership.
During the talks in Minsk, Chinese and Belarusian officials expressed support for the “peaceful resolution of conflicts and constructive bilateral dialogue between countries”, indirectly referring to the war in Ukraine. Lukashenko, who fully supports the China-proposed 2023 peace plan for the war-torn nation, tries to position himself as a “peacemaker.”
“Let’s sit down at the negotiating table and end this brawl,” he said on August 15, urging Moscow and Kyiv to negotiate an end to their conflict, pointing out that “neither the Ukrainian people, nor the Russians, nor the Belarusians need it.”
Threading the Needle Between Russia and China
His rhetoric is in line with the official Chinese approach regarding the Ukraine war. Over the past two and a half years, Beijing has been claiming neutrality and rhetorically supporting a peaceful outcome of the conflict. Critics have, however, labeled such a position as “pro-Russian neutrality”. That is the model Lukashenko would likely be eager to adopt.
But Belarus’ proximity to Russia, its membership in the CSTO and the EAEU, as well as the former Soviet republic’s strong economic ties with Moscow, prevent Lukashenko from fully implementing such a policy. Instead, he appears to be seeking a delicate balance between Minsk’s nominal alliance with Russia, and its growing political ties with China. In other words, Lukashenko likely aims to revive his “multi-vector” foreign policy by strengthening relations with China while continuing to nurture its partnership with Russia.
The fact that the Kremlin has still not demonstrated any large-scale successes at the front in Ukraine and that the Russian economy has become increasingly dependent on China gives Lukashenko enough room for various political maneuvers. His claim that he was allegedly advised to “turn away from Russia” and “fight together with Ukraine” suggests that he aims to get certain concessions from Moscow. In that game, Lukashenko’s strong personal relations with Xi could also give him some leverage over the Kremlin.
All that, however, does not mean that Belarus will leave Russia’s geopolitical orbit anytime soon. Instead, Lukashenko will likely remain relatively loyal to the Kremlin while using China as a counterbalance to enhance Belarus’s strategic position. Such a strategy can help the Belarusian strongman to stay in power at least for another presidential term.
