Why Does Mongolia Navigate Closer to Russia Amid Western Criticism?
By Nikola Mikovic
Vladimir Putin’s Visit to Mongolia
Despite pressure from the European Union and Ukraine, Mongolia did not arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin, who safely visited the Asian country on September 2-3. Although the decision to host the Russian leader in Mongolia’s capital of Ulaanbaatar might impact its relations with the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued arrest warrants for Putin in 2023, it is unlikely to have serious implications for its ties with the West.
Technically, it would be difficult for Mongolian authorities to arrest the Russian President and send him to The Hague to face a war crime trial, even if they wanted to. Mongolia is landlocked, surrounded by Russia and China. Mongolia has perhaps the most challenging geographical position on the modern globe. If we imagine a scenario where Putin was detained, the next question is how to transport him further. China would almost certainly not allow Mongolia to pass him through, and Russia would never permit it. There is no alternative route. Therefore, arresting the Russian leader and sending him to The Hague was never an option for Ulaanbaatar, despite pressure coming from some hardliners in the West and Ukraine.
Fully aware of this, Putin did not have to think twice before deciding to visit Mongolia. As a result, now that segments of Russian society are blaming the Kremlin for the recent military debacle in Kursk, the Russian leader can present his trip to the neighboring nation as a significant geopolitical victory.
At the same time, he can show that Russia might be isolated from the West, but not from the rest of the world. Putin’s trip to Ulaanbaatar undoubtedly had significant political goals. He likely sought to demonstrate to the Western audience that the ICC is an ineffective organization. He freely visited the country that recognizes ICC jurisdiction and that, according to its spokesperson, “has the obligation” to abide by ICC regulations. But despite being a signatory to the Rome Statute, Mongolia ignored unrealistic requests for Putin’s arrest.
Energy and Economic Ties
The landlocked nation of around 3.4 million people does not seem to have much choice but to preserve good ties with the Kremlin. Sandwiched between Russia in the north and China in the south, Mongolia’s economy remains heavily dependent on its giant neighbors. The country’s sources of imports are concentrated in China (which accounts for 35.2 % of total imports), Russia (29.6 %) and the EU (9.5 %). At this point, the Chinese economic presence in Mongolia is far greater than that of Russia.
It is, therefore, no surprise that Putin and his Mongolian counterpart Ukhnaa Khurelsukh discussed economic cooperation, particularly in the fields of energy, industry, and agriculture. Following the talks, the two leaders signed an agreement on cooperation regarding oil product supplies, as Russia’s State Nuclear Energy Corporation (Rosatom) announced plans to build a small modular nuclear power plant in Mongolia.
For Moscow, Mongolia is not only a “friendly” country but also a “comprehensive strategic partner.” In 2019, the two neighboring nations signed a “Permanent Treaty on Friendly Relations”, setting the stage for enhanced political and economic cooperation in the future.
For Russia, Mongolia is also an important transit route to China. In January 2022, one month before the Kremlin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s energy giant Gazprom and the Mongolian government signed a statement on a feasibility study for the construction of the Soyuz Vostok natural gas pipeline. The route should become an extension of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline connecting Russia and China via Mongolia.
One year earlier, in January 2021, Gazprom opened a subsidiary company called Gazoprovod Soyuz Vostok in Mongolia, hoping that it would soon begin building a 962.9-kilometer-long pipeline through Mongolian territory. However since Ulaanbaatar has not included Power of Siberia in its action program through 2028, it is not probable that construction of the Soyuz Vostok project will begin this year, as initially planned.
What additionally complicates the Kremlin’s ambitious gas plans is China’s price demand, as well as the fact that the Chinese market cannot compensate for Gazprom’s losses in Europe that came as a result of the EU’s “energy divorce” from Moscow. That is why it remains highly uncertain when, or even if, the Power of Siberia will be completed, and whether Mongolia will join the project and benefit from transit fees.
Despite that, energy continues to be one of the major drivers of Russia’s policy in Mongolia. Last year, according to Putin, more than 90% of gasoline and diesel fuel entered the Mongolian market from Russia. Moscow is also ready to “provide the necessary support in practical matters of gasification of Mongolia,” while it reportedly eyes to develop the China-Mongolia-Russia (CMR) economic corridor – a route that would allow the Kremlin to establish closer economic ties with Beijing.
Western Response
For Ulaanbaatar, Putin’s meeting with Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, the president of Mongolia, was yet another opportunity to show that the landlocked country aims to preserve a neutral stance regarding Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Such a position might help Mongolia strengthen relations with the Global South, and potentially even join BRICS in the future. It is unlikely a pure coincidence that Putin, during his visit to Mongolia, invited Khurelsukh to attend the next BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia next month. That, however, does not mean Mongolia will become BRICS’ newest member in October. Even so, participating in the organization’s summit helps Ulaanbaatar develop closer ties with the group’s members, including Russia.
During the Soviet era, Mongolia was widely seen as the unofficial “16th republic” of the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, Moscow lost much of its influence in the Asian country. Over the years, Mongolia has considered abandoning the Cyrillic alphabet and switching to its traditional alphabet instead. Russia also seems to be losing the language battle in the country. Until 2003, Russian was a compulsory subject in Mongolian schools. Since then, English has taken its place as a mandatory foreign language.
Thus, despite Mongolia’s unique position, being bordered by and reliant on Russia and China, the Kremlin will find it challenging to significantly increase its influence in Ulaanbaatar. The Asian nation is unlikely to give up on its “third neighbor” policy, aiming to develop closer ties with the West.
Although the European Union criticized Mongolia for failing to arrest Putin, it does not seem willing to impose any sanctions on Ulaanbaatar. Since the EU has never punished countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan for hosting Putin and signing various deals with the Kremlin, it is unlikely that they will impose any restrictions on Mongolia either. Strategic planners in the West know that geography plays an important role in Mongolia’s foreign policy and that the country sees Russia as a balance against Chinese economic and political dominance.
Ulaanbaatar, for its part, undoubtedly aims to benefit from closer economic cooperation with Russia. It is no secret that Mongolia has large high-quality coking coal reserves. Before the war in Ukraine, the land of the eternal blue sky sought to export its coal worldwide via the ports of the Russian Far East at Vladivostok and the Vostochny coal terminal. Now the authorities aim to maintain social stability at home by ensuring flawless energy supplies.
A Mongolian government spokesperson said, explaining why his country did not arrest Putin,
Mongolia imports 95% of its petroleum products and over 20% of electricity from our immediate neighborhood, which has previously suffered interruption for technical reasons. This supply is critical to ensure our existence and that of our people.
In other words, Mongolia’s strategic choices reflect a pragmatic approach to balancing regional interests and preserving internal stability. That is why Ulaanbaatar will almost certainly continue developing economic cooperation with Moscow – skillfully navigating through the latest regional and global developments – regardless of criticism coming from the West.
