Cold Waters Thawing India-China Relations
By Umer Beigh
Amid border tensions and US alignments, India resumes diplomacy with China, but trust remains elusive.
The recent meeting of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October provided the two countries with a structural mechanism to negotiate a patrolling agreement over Depsang Plains and Demchok, the disputed bordering areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The diplomatic ties between the two nations have remained at their lowest level since 2020. India has been trying to mend ways with China for the past few months, marked by engagement through military and diplomatic channels—Corps Commander-level talks at the military level and Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). The bilateral relations were strained since the two sides clashed in bordering Galwan Valley, along the LAC which led to the death of 24 soldiers.
The latest high-level talks between Indo-China including the foreign ministers have secured positive signals towards restarting bilateral ties. On November 19, China offered an olive branch, proposing direct flights, easing visa restrictions to Chinese citizens, and revisiting the ban on Chinese apps.
Historically, China has demonstrated a greater propensity to make concessions to its neighbors before a global summit, driven by its aspirations for global leadership.
“Among steps discussed were the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage, data sharing on trans-border Rivers, direct flights between India and China, and media exchange,” an Indian Ministry of External Affairs said.
Chinese projections
Considering that the Chinese economy faces problems domestically, such as pressure from the East, and the Americans, and the overall problem in Taiwan. All of these factors contribute to how China perceives India,
Professor Jabin Jacob, a Chinese expert who teaches at the Shiv Nadar University, notes. India removed itself from the US Cold War plan by improving its ties with the West. This dynamic of maintaining “strategic autonomy” fuels Chinese mistrust, particularly as India strengthens its participation in the Quad alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia. Jacob argues,
Such proximity has become another matter of concern for China. For the Communist Party of China, they are in an existential conflict with the Western style of democracy, from that point of view India is part of that Western-led coalition.
Besides other factors leading to the “mistrust” between the two neighbors remained unresolved border disputes: “We (Indians) took the idea of strategic guidance that the leaders were supposed to have ensured to their respective military to sort of back off from the conflict or from confrontation was taken seriously on both sides. We took the Chinese at their word and that obviously didn’t happen,” he added.
While India negotiates peace with China and participates in the Quad Leaders Summit in Delaware, it simultaneously seeks to strengthen its ties with Russia along with the US by “advocating for a rule-based order” in the Indo-Pacific. India wants to solidify the strategic gains of its relationship with Russia over the past two decades while trying to maintain a balanced foreign policy.
This dual alignment allows India to maintain flexibility while pursuing its economic and security goals similar to the role of Ankara in NATO by playing the role of the West against Russia to pursue its agenda.
Potential thaw in Indo-China relations
While being cautious, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar discussed the possibilities of “de-escalation” with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during the G-20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18. “China’s and India’s common interests far outweigh their differences,” Wang told Jaishankar. “The two sides should see each other’s development as an opportunity.”
Two days later, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh held another meeting with his Chinese counterpart Admiral Dong Jun in Laos.
These official interactions and diplomacy are significant in understanding the underlying context of how Indo-China is trying to rebuild the damaged relationship after four years of impasse.
While the Indian government has reiterated that border tension in contested areas directly impacts bilateral ties, the policymakers within the country are in favor of ‘stabilizing’ the relationship. The negative peace offers an opportunity for India to take advantage of the China+1 strategy by attracting FDI (foreign direct investments) from outsiders including China. The Indian state is keen to become a manufacturing node for Chinese companies that export globally.
India’s Cautiousness Regarding China
India maintains cautious optimism about the Chinese offer despite the restart of the relationship. The existing persistent trust deficit prevails due to the lingering dispute on LAC in Eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet). Though the two neighbors have achieved disengagement along certain friction points, relations haven’t returned to pre-2020 norms.
These days Beijing is turning on its charm diplomacy after years of muscular unilateralism on disputed frontiers with its neighbors, including India, and intense wolf-warrior diplomacy. Skeptics remind us that China’s mood could easily swing the other way at any time,
India’s foreign policy expert, C Raja Mohan, believed this cooperative tone would give way to unilateralism, and India’s military posture reflects this cautiousness.
Policy experts note that patrolling rights in several contested areas on LAC have yet to be fully restored. Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal speculated China’s willingness to resume ties this time around is possibly due to the Chinese motivation for its interests.
India’s broader strategic calculus remains largely insecure about growing Chinese tactical and strategic influence in South Asia, especially about its military maneuvers near Taiwan and the South China Sea further stoke India’s anxieties over Beijing’s regional ambition:
The transformation of Quad into a military alliance, perhaps incorporating additional ASEAN members, may jeopardize China’s national security, especially Chinese aspiration for the reunification of Taiwan,
Bharat Joshi, a research fellow in Chinese Studies, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told ScoonTv. Many observers in India want authorities to continue to participate in the Quad partnership and retain closer ties with Japan, the US, and Australia to critically counterbalance the assertiveness of China. While the disparity in trade ties stays, India seeks to reduce its economic dependency on China while simultaneously recognizing the necessity of cooperation in sectors like defense technology and manufacturing.
The reason India has drawn closer to Washington in the realm of defense is possibly due to the Chinese belligerence at the border and increased competition between the US and China. From the perspective of the US, there is an expectation for India to serve as a military bulwark in the region against China’s rise while India uses this partnership to modernize its military and enhance its regional influence. This is why the US seeks to position the Indian military as a frontline defense against China.
While the growing collaboration of Indo-US remains a key component to Washington’s broader containment strategy against China, India’s alignment with the US in the Indo-Pacific is the main reason that complicates the potential rapprochement between the two Asian powers.
Seemingly, India remains cautious towards fully normalizing its diplomatic ties with China. The negative peace may not be sustained for long without the resolution of underlying border issues. Besides the existing gaps in defense capabilities and trade deficit compel India to seek US intervention to balance the power. The potential fear of Chinese incursions at the disputed borders and potential flare-ups over Taiwan make India’s stance indecisive.
“Since India adheres to its principle of strategic autonomy under the PM Narendra Modi administration, the goal is to achieve Viksit Bharat (developed India by 2047). It needs sustained economic growth for a long time. Hence, it won’t completely ally with the US unless its territorial integration is directly threatened by any of its belligerent neighbors,” Bharat said.
