Breakout in Kursk
By Todd Davis
Month after month the war between Russia, Ukraine, and NATO had turned into a contest of attrition that was unwinnable by the Western powers. Russian industry is producing more of every conceivable military goods needed to fight and sustain a long war. Arms deliveries from Great Britain have effectively ceased. Germany declared it would have to cut its support by half in 2025. The United States was stuck in neutral as the Democrats and Republicans began fighting their partisan war as elections loom in the fall. All of this led to Ukraine, slowly but surely, losing town after town in the Donbass. Defeat was inevitable. Inexorable. Preordained at this point and the only remaining drama was what kind of peace terms would Ukraine have to accept.
Emulating their spiritual predecessors in Nazi Germany who launched its own surprise attack that history would come to know as the Battle of the Bulge, Ukraine, on August 6th, invaded Russia in the Kursk region. Utilizing their most battle-hardened mechanized brigades, Ukraine rapidly penetrated Federation defense forces causing havoc on the ground and embarrassing Russia on the world stage.
Ukrainian Objectives
Objectives for Ukraine’s advance were unclear, even as its dispersed fast-moving units exerted control over hundreds of square kilometers of Russian territory. The offensive caught the Western politicians and media with as much surprise as it did the Russians. Media coverage has been sparse because the American elections are dominating the news cycle and there isn’t a clear positive narrative to spin about Ukraine. Much of the media coverage on Ukraine recently has been fatalistic, an acceptance that Ukraine is never getting back Russian-held territory and a peace deal should be reached at some vague point in the future.
Zelensky didn’t mention objectives until the likely objective Ukraine was aiming for, the Kursk nuclear power plant near Kurchatov, was thwarted. This plant is the third-largest nuclear power facility in Russia. Capturing the plant would be a significant achievement for Ukraine and a bargaining chip worth holding in peace talks. Ukraine didn’t reach the plant, though, and isn’t going to get there now as Russian forces coalesce in the area. In the aftermath, Zelensky engaged in an evolving narrative of Monday Morning Quarterbacking.
The first stated reason for the offensive, articulated about a week after the attack began, was the desire to occupy land within Russia that could be used for negotiations in peace talks. Ukraine would give back the parts of Kursk it held in exchange for Russia giving back the Donbass. It’s hard to believe anyone took this belief seriously. Russia has labeled the Ukrainian invasion an act of terrorism. Vladimir Putin said there is no possible way Russia can negotiate with Ukraine now.
What kind of negotiations can we talk about with people who indiscriminately attack the civilian population, and civilian infrastructure, or try to create threats to nuclear power facilities? What can we even talk about with them?
More importantly, the Ukraine invasion is an act that Russia can point to as proof that no negotiations are possible with Ukraine when talking to fellow BRICS members. China, especially, feels outraged over Ukraine’s offensive. Urges for restraint in the war put on Russia by BRICS and the Global South will now likely subside. Kiev has floated the idea that peace talks can be held without a direct Russian agreement. This is fantastical. Ukraine is in a worse negotiating position now than it was pre-invasion. Russian resolve has hardened, Putin has the political capital to point to an invasion of Russia, backed and aided by NATO, to rally his people while being able to justify the intensification of the war to his allies.
The next objective stated by Ukraine was the offensive into Kursk would force the Russians to divert forces from the Donbass thereby relieving pressure on besieged Ukrainian positions in that region. One of the great advantages that Russia possesses is the vastness of the country. Invaders entering Russia are confronted by mile after mile, an endless horizon that swallows armies. Although surprised and embarrassed by the incursion, Russia didn’t move brigades from the Donbass into the area. It relied on territorial defense units, accepting that they would be overwhelmed by the Ukrainian spearhead willing to surrender land for time.
Russia brought in one heavy brigade, the 810th Marines from Sevastopol, and working with Chechen militia, this unit covered a remarkable frontage of 70 km, fighting the Ukrainian push to a standstill. Massed sorties by Russian Aerospace forces have made movement by Ukrainian tanks and AFVs a dangerous enterprise. During the ten days of Ukrainian advances, no Russian forces were transferred out of the Donbass. And it’s become clear that none will be. Russia has continued its unrelenting advance putting itself in a position to soon capture the critical Ukrainian town of Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is a key supply hub for the AFU and its loss will create a series of unsolvable logistical problems for Ukraine. Any hope of diverting or slowing the Russian liberation of the Donbass has failed.
Finally, Zelensky seemed to settle on the narrative that an incursion into Russia would create a “buffer zone” between the two warring nations. How a buffer zone within the Russian homeland would ever be accepted by the nation winning the war is anyone’s guess. Not even the most ardent Ukrainian supporters could sustain this reasoning. The entire idea of a buffer zone, for presumably Sumy, wouldn’t make sense because the land Ukraine occupies has no air bases on it and Russian aviation can and still does bomb Sumy unaffected by the Ukrainian occupation.
What Has Ukraine Accomplished?
Ukraine’s initial unsaid objective, the capture of the Kursk nuclear power plant, failed. Subsequent objectives don’t hold water under scrutiny. What then has Ukraine accomplished with its offensive? There is no question the attack embarrassed Russia and Vladimir Putin. Russia was firmly in control of the war and seemingly put the images of Ukraine seizing Lyman in the lighting-quick Kharkov offensive behind it. The battles around Kursk demonstrated that in the third year of the war, Russia still had incapable commanders and a lack of efficient coordination along the entire front. Russia now has to deal with an invading force on its soil not in the Donbass.
Further, Ukraine boosted the morale of its army. The AFU had faced months of defeat. Dashing into Kursk alleviated it partially from the grinding attrition that was breaking its spirit. Ukraine has taken several hundred prisoners and they will be exchanged for AFU soldiers in Russian captivity. Some of the elan that had defined Ukraine in 2022 was regained. In the process, Ukraine generated positive headlines, even if the media has been skeptical and wary about where this offensive will lead. In theory, this should shore up support among the Western financial backers of the war. In reality, NATO and the economic hubs in the EU and America are exhausted by the war. A breakout over the border is unlikely to change that.
Ukraine demonstrated that it still has some sharp tools in its arsenal. That, more than anything, will have the most lasting impact of the Kursk breakout. The threat that Ukraine can still cause damage stinging the prestige of the Russian Federation could be a factor in getting a peace deal if Ukraine ever gets serious about negotiating.
Kursk Turning into Another Rabotino
Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive in 2023 converged around the small town of Rabotino. Rabotino proved to be the maximum extent of Ukrainian gains turning into a focal point where Russian Aerospace forces and artillery hammered at the AFU relentlessly. Week after week. Rabotino turned into a trap for the AFU. The Ukrainian breakout into the Kursk region looks like it is going to turn into another Rabotino.
Any invading army moving into Russia faces the inevitable question; where are we advancing to? Occupying dense forests, dry steppe, or barren taiga doesn’t win wars. Even in the insatiable headline-seeking world of 2024, you can’t win a war through narrative manipulation. The story on the ground will always determine the course of events. Ukraine has begun blowing up bridges in the combat zone. Advancing armies don’t blow up bridges. Calling it a buffer zone is semantics, it’s clear what Ukraine is doing; the AFU is digging in and going on the defensive.
Sudzha, a town of about 5,000 people, remains the largest, and likely only, sizable population center that Ukraine managed to occupy in this attack. Russian ground forces, still not fully ready to respond, have blunted the forward momentum of the AFU. Using a dispersed defense, the 810th Marines bought time for the Russian counterattack. Russia, not known for responding with alacrity in this war, will assemble the forces needed to eliminate this incursion.
Losses are beginning to mount for Ukraine during this operation. Of the initial 20,000 AFU soldiers involved in the attack, Ukraine has suffered around 5,000 casualties. In addition, it has lost over 100 tanks and AFVs. Some of those will be recovered, and reinforcements have been sent to Kursk, but the initial rush is over and now the battle will degenerate into the war of attrition that so heavily favors the Russians. Ukraine may hold settlements in Kursk for weeks, maybe months, and yet the result is inevitable. Russia is going to grind down Ukraine, retake the area, and inflict significant losses on the AFU in the process.
Win, Lose, or Draw?
There is little Ukraine can do to prevent this outcome. The United States will not allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles to strike deep into Russia. And while some may lament these limitations, you can’t have the Americans giving weapons to Ukraine for use on Russian soil. This would represent a dramatic escalation the likes of which we haven’t seen. Ukraine has no way to improve its position in the pocket. Taking further trees doesn’t do anything except create logistical problems. Getting to the Kursk nuclear power plant is no longer possible as Russian defensive lines begin to harden.
One of the biggest problems facing Ukraine in this war is defending an expansive frontline that eats up men and material. When Russia opened up the Kharkov region as a new flashpoint this summer it stretched Ukraine. Voluntarily opening up another front in Kursk will push Ukraine to the breaking point if it goes on and on without results. While Kampfgruppe Zelensky is in Kursk, Russia is making gains in the Donbass daily. Ukrainian resistance is fading away. There is no way Ukraine can stop Russia from completely taking the Donbass. Was it worth exchanging Kursk for Pokrovsk? From a strategic perspective, is this a win or a loss for Ukraine? And what about Russia? Kursk will be hard to view as a win for Russia short of it encircling the entire AFU battlegroup in the region and cutting it off. Taking months to retake Russian soil isn’t going to look good, especially if a town like Sudzha has to be reduced to rubble in the process. Kursk appears to be heading toward a draw where neither side is entirely pleased with the results.
What then does Ukraine do with Kursk? Based on what we’ve seen in this war Ukraine will not retreat even though this is now the best course of action before its elite brigades get pinned down in Russia. Ukraine is trying hard to spin this into capital to get peace on Ukrainian terms. That is a dream. Further evidence that Ukraine still doesn’t have a grounded grasp on how this war is going to end. Every day Ukraine holds villages in Kursk no matter how small they are, is a day of further embarrassment for Russia. Inflicting embarrassing moments doesn’t win wars of attrition. Unless Kursk can be parlayed into something tangible, the legacy of the breakout will serve as a reminder of the flair and audacity Ukraine at times showed in the conflict, an interesting story in the history of a war whose outcome has never been in doubt.
