The Fragile Alliance Between Russia and Iran
By Nikola Mikovic
Turbulent Relations with Russia and Iran Persist
Despite their close military ties, Russia and Iran are not formal allies. The two nations act as situational partners who attempt to defy Western geopolitical interests. However, they often have opposing views on major global issues – from the tense situation in the Middle East to various disputes in the South Caucasus.
The escalation of the conflict between Israel and Iran could impact Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, as it might force Tehran to halt its arms supplies to Moscow and focus on the needs of its military. It is an open secret that, in the summer of 2022, the Islamic Republic supplied Moscow with Shahed drones. Later it helped Russia launch a domestic version of the loitering munition unmanned aerial vehicle, known as the Geran-2. Rumors are flying that Russia also received short-range ballistic missiles from Iran. But unlike the West, which openly supports and arms Ukraine, Tehran has never publicly admitted to providing weapons to Moscow.
There may have been such deliveries in the past. But I can assure you that there have been no such deliveries to Russia since I took office,
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said on September 23, claiming that his country has “never supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
Pezeshkian, who became Iran’s president on August 30, also denied supplying ballistic missiles to Russia, claiming that the Islamic Republic is “willing to sit down with the Europeans and the Americans to have a dialogue and negotiations.” But instead of holding talks with Western leaders, Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 11 in Turkmenistan’s capital of Ashgabat, on the sidelines of the Interconnection of Times and Civilizations – Basis of Peace and Development international forum.
According to reports, Putin wanted to create a “new world order” comprising Moscow’s allies to counter Western influence. He also emphasized that Moscow and Tehran’s positions on international events are often “closely aligned.” However, sometimes they are not.
Prior to their meeting, Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of Russia’s security council, visited Tehran on several occasions, reportedly aiming to ensure smooth arms supplies to the Russian military. Although his summits with Iranian military officials indicate that Moscow and Tehran are close to establishing a historic partnership agreement, their relations still have significant cracks.
Russian Relations with Israel and Iran
For instance, despite Western speculations that Russia is allegedly planning to deliver anti-ship cruise missiles to Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militias, the Kremlin seems to have turned its back on the Shia group. Providing the Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, with anti-ship cruise missiles would represent Putin’s “symmetrical response” to a potential US approval for Kyiv to use American-made missiles to strike Russian territory. But pressured by the United States and Saudi Arabia, Moscow has reportedly given up on its ambition to arm the Houthis. Instead, Moscow plans to reopen its embassy in Yemen’s Aden, which is under the control of the Saudi-backed government. The Houthis’ government, based in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, is recognized only by Iran. Moscow and Tehran, therefore, do not seem to share the same perspective on the situation in Yemen.
It is also rather questionable whether Russia and Iran align in their views regarding the ongoing Israeli actions against its major opponents – Hamas and Hezbollah. Following the Israeli killing of the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Putin asked Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for a “restrained response.” Did Putin actually act as an ally of Israel?
“Despite its significant military presence in Syria, Russia has not intervened to prevent Israeli airstrikes against Iranian forces or their proxies in the region,” Mohsen Solhdoost, the Iranian-born Assistant Professor at the Department of International Studies at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, told Scoon TV. Solhdoost stressed,
Moreover, despite Iran’s long-standing vulnerabilities in air defense and air force capabilities, Russia has consistently declined to supply Tehran with advanced weapon systems or fighter jets. These examples suggest that, in practice, Russia has often sided more with Israel than with Iran,
Fereshteh Sadeghi, a Tehran-based journalist focusing on Iranian domestic politics, insists that no one can deny nor confirm reports of Russia supplying advanced weapon systems or fighter jets to the Islamic Republic.
Iran might have received some of these weapons, but it has decided to announce it gradually. Some reports suggest that Russia has delivered Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 batteries to Tehran, and has even trained Iranian pilots to use those jets in Syria,
Sadeghi told Scoon TV, pointing out that she does not think that Russia, in the event of a large-scale war between Iran and Israel, would help Tehran actively or openly.
“There are always ways to assist Iran, especially in terms of jamming and electronic warfare. Russia, on the other hand, can learn from Iran’s experience and methods how to circumvent Western sanctions,” she said, emphasizing that there is no doubt that Moscow and Tehran are partners.
Indeed, on September 30, Pezeshkian told Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin that Iran and Russia can further strengthen cooperation between the two countries, “especially in the issue of countering Western sanctions.” More importantly, during his meeting with Putin in Ashgabat, the Iranian President said that he hoped the agreement on strategic partnership between Moscow and Tehran could be finalized at the BRICS summit scheduled for October 22-24 in the Russian city of Kazan.
Iran is worried about Russia’s South Caucasus policy
However, their partnership seems to have some limits, as the two nations do not always have the same geopolitical goals. For instance, Moscow has recently supported the construction of the Zangezur Corridor (also known as the Nakhchivan corridor) – a land route that should connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan, and further with its ally Turkey, through southern Armenia along its border with Iran. Baku expects Yerevan to create a passport-free zone without any border control along its section of the Nakhchivan corridor, which is something that Tehran resolutely opposes.
If built under Azerbaijani conditions, the Zangezur Corridor would leave Iran’s north semi-encircled by the two Turkic states – NATO member Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan. That is why Iranian authorities have repeatedly stated that they will not tolerate changes to regional borders, calling the issue Iran’s “red line.” The problem for Tehran, however, is that Armenia – Russia’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – continues distancing itself from the Kremlin and seeks to develop closer ties with the West instead. Yerevan’s anti-Russian geopolitical vector could have serious implications for Iran’s interests in the South Caucasus.
For decades, Armenia’s frontiers with Turkey and Iran have been guarded solely by Russian troops. Following dissatisfaction with the role of Moscow in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Yerevan now wants Russian forces out of the former Soviet republic. According to the agreement Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reached on October 8, Russian border guards will withdraw from the Armenian-Iranian border checkpoints as of January 1, 2025.
The landlocked South Caucasus nation has also suspended its participation in the CSTO in February 2024 and aims to leave the Russian-dominated alliance in the foreseeable future. There are fears in Tehran that Yerevan could eventually permit a US military presence along its border with Iran, which is the last thing the Islamic Republic wants.
Conversely, Moscow does not seem particularly interested in keeping Armenia within its orbit and is instead focused on developing closer ties with Azerbaijan. Tehran views Moscow’s engagement with Baku as an existential threat to the Islamic Republic, especially given the close military ties between Azerbaijan and Israel.
Thus, under the current geopolitical circumstances, where Moscow and Tehran often have opposing goals, developing a strategic partnership between the two countries could be easier said than done.
