By Savannah Hamilton
Editor’s note: The opinions expressed here are those of the authors. View more opinions on ScoonTV
The World’s Big Bioweapons Problem
We open the scene at a biological research lab in Siberia, where a young lab tech, Daria Shipilova, is testing samples when… Oops!
One of the vials dramatically drops to the floor and breaks. And just days later, she dies from severe pneumonia of “unknown origin”.
To all fans of the Resident Evil franchise, I’m sorry to disappoint you that this isn’t a leaked upcoming script but rather what (allegedly) happened in Russia a few weeks ago.
You probably saw the headlines yourself, with the media in a frenzy over what many feared could turn into the next COVID-style pandemic. But after close contacts were reportedly tested and no one else seemed to have fallen ill, the news moved on to bigger and better things. You know, like the massive protests sweeping across Europe and France.
Meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported no evidence of ongoing transmission linked to the incident, based on information provided by Russian authorities. But there’s one rather peculiar detail, which is that the cause of death of the lab tech remains unknown.
And, well, that leaves us with more questions than answers.
More broadly, the incident has also brought an old issue back into focus — biological weapons, and whether the international community can actually ensure that the regulations against them are being followed.
In case you weren’t aware, biological weapons have been banned under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Pretty much the entire world has signed on, with Israel standing out as the notable exception (interesting), while a few others, like Egypt and Syria, signed but never formally ratified it.
Yes, unfortunately, this is a bit like RSVP-ing to a party. Countries can say they’ll show up and promise to behave, but there’s no proper bouncer at the door to check who comes or what they’re actually doing once they get inside.
And that’s where the real story begins.
This isn’t about assuming Russia is hiding something, or treating an unexplained death as proof of a biological weapons incident. It’s about the much bigger question of what good is an international ban on biological weapons if the world has no proper system for verifying when rules are followed?
The Situation As It Stands
The WHO update highlights the issue perfectly. Yes, the WHO’s assessment offered some reassurance, reporting no evidence of ongoing transmission linked to the incident, thus no hint of any sinister activity. But that doesn’t tell us what caused Shipilova’s illness, or establish whether any accident occurred.
More importantly, said assessment relied on information provided by Russian authorities. Its published report describes requests for information and follow-up with Russia, but no on-site inspection of the laboratory or independent investigation into the cause of death.
That doesn’t make Russia’s account false. It just means the assessment relies on what the WHO was told, not an actual look at the site. Which is exactly the problem.
Sure, no sign of an outbreak is nice to hear. But despite it being 2026, when it comes to biological threats, the world has to rely on governments’ self-reporting and pray to God they’re being honest.
And historical precedent, ironically enough from Russia itself, shows us why this can be a problem.
History Repeats Itself?
The Soviet Union saw a similar show before back in April of 1979, when an anthrax outbreak in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) killed dozens of people. The official explanation? Spoiled meat. Nothing to see here.
Western officials weren’t convinced, though. There was gossip about a nearby military microbiology lab being involved, raising some eyebrows about whether the country was complying with the very biological weapons treaty it had signed a few years earlier. But of course, Moscow maintained its composure and rejected calls for further consultation.
And yet, years later, revelations proved the rumors to be true, meaning the outbreak had indeed been caused by a release from the military facility in question. Shocker.
That said, the recent incident in Siberia isn’t a repeat of Sverdlovsk. There’s no established evidence linking Shipilova’s death to a biological weapons program, and the circumstances and government are different.
But the lesson worth remembering here is that when a government’s account cannot be independently examined, getting to the truth can take years. Which, in today’s already politically tense world, hits a little too close to home. A handshake treaty that relies heavily on countries explaining their own activities, without a proper watchdog, has an obvious weakness.
“Trust Me, Bro”
This is not to say the BWC is completely useless. Countries can raise concerns with one another, request consultations, and even bring suspected violations before the UN Security Council. There’s also a UN mechanism that can investigate allegations of biological or chemical weapons use.
But notice the wording — “can” investigate.
This isn’t equivalent to having an international neighbourhood watchdog casually popping into labs to see what everyone’s cooking. Nor is there a permanent inspection agency routinely monitoring facilities to check that countries are sticking to the rules.
And if you’re wondering whether other weapons treaties have managed to do this better, the answer is yes. The Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, has its own organisation — the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It actually carries out international inspections to help verify compliance. Meanwhile, the BWC equivalent is still stuck in its “sure, maybe, we’ll-get-to-it” era.
Now, there have been attempts to fix this, but negotiations over something more legally binding fell through in 2001 after countries failed to agree on how such a system should work. The main concerns were whether inspections would actually catch violations, not to mention the risk of exposing sensitive military information, commercial secrets, and legitimate research. So, since then, governments have continued discussing ways to cooperate, but nothing seems to stick.
And honestly, you can see why this gets complicated. No country is exactly eager to invite foreign authorities (and potential spies) into its top secret facilities and say, “Please, have a look around! The sensitive national security material is just down the hall to the left.”
It’s basically an awkward balancing act — countries want to protect their secrets while asking everyone else to trust that they’re playing by the rules.
Not to mention, not all biological research is sus. Actually, much of it serves legitimate purposes to save lives down the road. Researchers could very well be working on treatments, vaccines, or ways to prevent future outbreaks. However, the same scientific knowledge and techniques can, under certain circumstances or in the wrong hands, be misused to develop bioweapons.
Which is what makes verification so tricky. Inspectors can’t simply walk into a lab, spot a dangerous pathogen, and be like, “Aha! Got ya!” One needs to be able to clearly distinguish legit scientific studies from the next Bond movie plot. All without exposing sensitive information or obstructing research that protects public health.
Ok so, how do you tell the difference?
The Dual-Use Dilemma
Unlike a suspicious briefcase full of cash exchanged under a bridge, biological research doesn’t come with a clear and convenient label saying “perfectly innocent” or “potential pandemic”.
The problem is what’s known as the dual-use dilemma — the same research can protect people or hurt them.
Take research into dangerous pathogens. Understanding how a virus spreads can be essential to developing treatments and protecting public health. The Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute at the center of this discussion is literally made for this purpose, as the plague, believe it or not, still occurs in nature and is more common in Siberia and Central Asia.
But some of that knowledge could also help someone make a pathogen more dangerous, or easier to spread, or, as we saw in No Time to Die, potentially target a specific person(s). The science itself isn’t automatically a red flag — it’s what someone does with it that matters.
And no, the solution can’t simply be to ban research involving dangerous pathogens. That would be a bit like trying to prevent car accidents by banning auto shops. Scientists need to study this precisely because they can pose serious threats to human health. The challenge is figuring out how to support actual research while reducing the risk that it gets misused. That means proper biosafety procedures, oversight, secure handling of dangerous materials, and defining what is or isn’t permitted.
Those safeguards are largely implemented and overseen at the national level, where standards and enforcement can vary. International agreements can establish expectations, but without stronger transparency and ways to establish compliance, it becomes harder to build confidence that everyone is managing all risks responsibly.
Which brings us back to our original problem. Even if every country insists its research is for the greater good, the rest of the world still needs credible ways to assess those assurances without shutting down the science that keeps us safe.
So, What Can We Actually Do?
That is the trillion-dollar question.
First, let’s be realistic. No country is ever going to be thrilled about turning its most sensitive facilities into an open house for international scrutiny. But that doesn’t mean the current arrangement is the best we can do.
For starters, the BWC needs a stronger system to ensure that countries are keeping their commitments. That could mean agreed procedures for addressing suspicious incidents, a verification framework that lets independent experts investigate such concerns, and safeguards to protect legitimate research and sensitive information.
Transparency matters, too — obviously. When a serious biological incident occurs, timely reporting, access to reliable scientific information, and cooperation with international authorities can help establish what happened before rumors fill in the gaps. That doesn’t mean every incident requires a nosy inspection team arriving with a clipboard and a search warrant — just clear procedures for when scrutiny is high.
There is also a role for stronger biosafety standards, better training and oversight of research that carries significant risks of misuse. Governments, labs and international organizations need to cooperate fully, rather than assuming a treaty signed decades ago will somehow do the heavy lifting. Because spoiler alert — it won’t!
Of course, none of this comes without complications.
Inspections can expose sensitive information, reporting systems can be abused for political point-scoring, and countries will disagree over who gets access and under what circumstances. Any serious proposal has to address those concerns, not simply wave them off.
Also, let’s be so for real here for a minute. If any government were truly intent on hiding something, they would probably find a way to do so.
That said, it doesn’t make verification pointless. The aim isn’t to catch every crime, but to make it harder for the Bond villains to get away with it. The goal isn’t to turn every public health lab into a CSI episode or treat every unexplained cough as evidence of a secret weapons program. It’s to build a proper system that gives everyone incentives to be more honest, where serious concerns can be properly investigated, and where legitimate research can continue without unnecessary shakedowns.
Right now, Daria Shipilova’s death is still officially a mystery, and the treaty that exists to prevent exactly this kind of uncertainty has no way to solve it.
Meanwhile, COVID-19 gave everyone a friendly reminder that an outbreak anywhere can have consequences far beyond one village. And that shared vulnerability alone should give governments every reason to cooperate even when they don’t trust one another. Now, whether they actually will is another story.
If the world is serious about keeping biological weapons off the table, it needs more than a ban and a promise, as when it comes to international security, “trust me, bro” is not exactly a reassuring policy.
Curtis Scoon is the founder of ScoonTv.com Download the ScoonTv App to join our weekly livestream every Tuesday @ 8pm EST! Support true independent media. Become a VIP member www.scoontv.com/vip-signup/ and download the ScoonTv App from your App Store.
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