By Todd Davis
A sea-borne drone strike at a little-known place called Bandar Abbas may have changed the future of naval warfare. Although not as bombastic as the sinking of the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse of the coast of Malaya by the Japanese, ushering in the age of the carrier, the US naval strike on Iran at Bandar Abbas will have a similar resonance.
Three Corsair drones successfully struck an Iranian Ghadir-class submarine on July 12th. This was the first time the U.S. Navy (USN) has deployed unmanned surface vessels in an offensive maritime strike. The use of the Corsair isn’t as revolutionary as the adaptation of the technology by the world’s most powerful navy. Last year, the USN had no unmanned surface vessels (USVs). Today, they are being used in active combat operations. That is an unheard-of developmental and deployment pace for an institution as large and tradition-bound as the USN.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on X:
Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea drones in combat operations. Last night’s strikes degraded Iran’s ability to continue attacking commercial shipping.
Lessons from Ukraine
The remarkable potential of USVs was originally demonstrated by Ukraine in the Black Sea, first during the initial stages of the war and currently taking place during Operation Molochka. Ukraine has struck over 200 Russian vessels, both military ships and now civilian tankers part of the Russian shadow fleet. Molochka is an attempt by a nation without a navy to impose a naval blockade on a world power. The Ukrainian theater of operations includes the Black and Azov Seas.
Ukraine’s Unmanned System Forces are utilizing a variety of domestically developed USVs. Starting with the Sea Baby that was so effective in sinking Russian warships in the early months of the war, leading to a new generation of USVs such as the Sargan-3000, Mamai, Magura V5, and the newly unveiled Sea Trident that weighs 10 tons and is capable of deep-sea long-range naval strikes.
Ukraine has no naval tradition nor legacy shaping its worldview and dictating combat operations. Operating with a blank slate, the Ukrainians have been able to work with speed and innovation, tailoring the development and use of USVs to shape the active conflict they are facing. High stakes in a pressurized environment where results, not weapon sales, matter have led to Ukraine being an innovator in this new technology.
Saronic
Saronic, the Texas-based company that builds the Corsair, wasn’t founded decades ago; it’s only been around since 2022. In addition to the Corsair, they also advertise the Mirage and the Marauder. Saronic defines its mission as,
We’re redefining maritime superiority…By providing naval and maritime forces with the most intelligent and autonomous surface vessels available, we directly increase their ability to address the emerging challenges of the future, and revolutionize the future of naval warfare.
The speed at which Saronic has been able to move from prototype to procurement, to combat operations is unheard of in modern American military manufacturing. The USN awarded a production contract in December 2025, integrated Saronic tech into an active theater, and executed the historic combat strike this July. This type of alacrity doesn’t look at all like the military industrial complex, it looks more like the lightning-fast tech development in Silicon Valley.
Further, these Corsairs aren’t produced at the glacial pace that Patriot missiles come off the assembly line. In an X post on May 6th, 2026, Saronic stated that 300 Corsairs have been built, going from prototypes to production in a year. The USN can rapidly acquire entire combat groups of Corsairs and their successors.
Modern American Naval Operations
The interest in USVs isn’t new. Back in 2007, the USN formalized its first plan for the use of USVs in reconnaissance and defensive capacities. The primary goal was to take over dangerous or monotonous tasks, such as hunting mines or conducting surveillance. During the 2010s, the escalating cost of maintaining a blue ocean navy compelled the Navy to explore alternatives to prohibitively expensive surface ships.
All of these ideas crystallized when Ukraine began using USVs on offensive operations against Russia in the Black Sea. The USN is vigorously using the Black and now the Azov Seas as an active battle laboratory. Ukraine’s unmanned surface munitions crippled and forced the retreat of Russia’s conventional surface fleet in the Black Sea. Operation Molochka is putting real stress on Russian commercial shipping. These operations have proven that USV assets can alter strategic naval realities.
The Mahan principle of a blue water navy has not been disproven by the USV. It is important to note that Ukraine can achieve a tactical advantage in geographical choke points like the Black and Azov Seas, where USVs can operate within a smaller environment than, say, the Pacific Ocean. The United States is grappling with its own choke point in the Strait of Hormuz during the current conflict with Iran. However, the only reason the United States can project power off the coast of Iran is that it has the Carrier force and infrastructure to support it that can be used thousands of miles from the homeland.
Bandar Abbas didn’t prove that USVs could succeed. We already knew that from Ukraine. It demonstrated something equally important: the world’s premier navy was willing to incorporate a disruptive technology into combat doctrine instead of relying solely on the assumptions of the carrier age. The USN demonstrated an unusual degree of institutional agility, actively studying modern combat operations and integrating that tech into existing operational doctrine. What makes Bandar Abbas historic is that the USN concluded that USVs are no longer experimental or a desperate technology used by a nation fighting for its survival. They are operational weapons.
For over a century, navies have built fewer and fewer ships because each one became more capable and vastly more expensive. USVs reverse that trend. Suddenly, quantity matters again. A navy can afford to lose drones that cost a fraction of a destroyer while still imposing costs on an adversary. That is a profound change in naval economics as much as naval tactics.
Bandar Abbas will likely be remembered less for the submarine that was destroyed than for what the strike represented. Ukraine demonstrated that unmanned surface vessels could reshape naval warfare in the confined waters of the Black Sea. The United States demonstrated something different: that the world’s largest and most tradition-bound navy could absorb those lessons, field a new technology at remarkable speed, and employ it successfully in combat.
Naval history is filled with moments when emerging technologies moved from experiment to accepted doctrine. The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse confirmed that the aircraft carrier had eclipsed the battleship. Battleships weren’t replaced overnight. America would go on to build Iowa-class battleships until the end of that war. But their time was over. There are no battleships today. Bandar Abbas may come to mark the moment when unmanned surface vessels ceased being experimental platforms and became accepted instruments of American sea power. The submarine destroyed in the attack was the immediate target. The real significance of Bandar Abbas was that it demonstrated a new way of exercising sea power.
